Meeting on Hiding and Disclosing Information


all slides in a zip


  • 9h30: welcome

  • 10h-10h45: Kostas Chatzikokolakis
    Measuring Information Leakage using Generalized Gain Functions

    transparents This talk introduces g-leakage, a rich generalization of the min-entropy model of quantitative information flow. In g-leakage, the benefit that an adversary derives from a certain guess about a secret is specified using a gain function g. Gain functions allow a wide variety of operational scenarios to be modeled, including those where the adversary benefits from guessing a value close to the secret, guessing a part of the secret, guessing a property of the secret, or guessing the secret within some number of tries. I will discuss important properties of g-leakage, including bounds between min-capacity, g-capacity, and Shannon capacity. Moreover I will discuss a connection between a strong leakage ordering on two channels, C1 and C2, and the possibility of factoring C1 into C_2C_3, for some C3. Based on this connection, I will propose a generalization of the Lattice of Information from deterministic to probabilistic channels.

  • 10h45-11h45: Annabelle McIver
    Abstract Entropies for Abstract Channels

    transparents Communication channels are measured for leakage by comparing the entropy of the prior distribution (on inputs) with the conditional entropy on the posterior distributions (induced by observed outputs). A wide variety of entropies can be used for this, and recently the "gain function" approach [1] has been shown to be a generalisation of many of them. In that context we have recently generalised channels to "abstract channels" that retain only the essential information needed to evaluate those entropies [2].

    In this talk I will go further, showing how gain functions themselves are special cases of something slightly more general [3]: they are (duals of) concave, continuous functions on spaces of distributions. Defining continuity for a function on distributions requires (eg) a metric between distributions, and it is no surprise that the Kantorovich metric works well. In particular, the K-distance between distributions turns out to be related to the maximum leakage over all abstract entropies (thus bounding the maximum leakage wrt gain functions, since they are a special case).

    I will outline the benefits this more general viewpoint brings, its relation to the (Giry) monad approach to computation, and the opportunities this offers for further research.

    [1] Measuring Information Leakage using Generalized Gain Functions (M. Alvim, K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi, G. Smith), CSF 2012
    [2]Abstract channels and their robust information-leakage ordering (A. McIver, C. Morgan, G. Smith, B. Espinoza, L. Meinicke), PoST under review 2014
    [3] A Kantorovich-monadic powerdomain for information hiding, with probability and nondeterminism (A. McIver, L. Meinicke, C. Morgan), LiCS 2012

  • 11h45-12h30: Nicolas Bordenabe
    Location privacy protection through an optimal and differentialy private obfuscation mechanism

    transparents The growing popularity of location-based systems, allowing unknown/untrusted servers to easily collect huge amounts of information regarding users' location, has recently started raising serious privacy concerns. In this work, we study a formal notion of location privacy that protects the user's exact location, while allowing approximate information - typically needed to obtain a certain desired service - to be released. This notion is derived from a generalized version of the well-known concept of differential privacy, and therefore has the property of being independent from the adversary's prior knowledge. Moreover, we show a method to obtain an obfuscation mechanism that satisfies our location privacy definition while achieving optimal utility. However, since this method is in general computationally demanding, we also present an alternative and more efficient approach to obtain a mechanism with the same privacy guarantees and approximate optimal utility. Finally, we perform a detailed evaluation using traces of real users form the GeoLife dataset. We evaluate the privacy guarantees of our mechanism in comparison with other state-of-the-art approaches, and the effects of the approximation method in terms of utility and efficiency.

  • 12h30-14h: lunch

  • 14h-14h45: Stefan Schwoon
    Optimal Constructions for Active Diagnosis

    transparents This talk presents joint work with Stefan Haar, Serge Haddad, and Tarek Melliti, to be presented at FSTTCS 2013. The task of diagnosis consists in detecting, without ambiguity, occurrence of faults in a partially observed system. Active diagnosis means to control the system in such a way that unambiguous detection of faults is always possible (within a bounded delay). Solutions have already been proposed for the active diagnosis problem, but their complexity remains to be improved. We propose an improved method for active diagnosis based on automata theory and prove that it is optimal with respect to several criteria. We also construct a memory-optimal diagnoser whose fault-detection delay is at most twice the minimal delay, whereas the memory required for a diagnoser with optimal delay may be highly greater.

  • 14h45-15h30: Serge Haddad
    Active diagnosis for probabilistic systems
    joint work with Nathalie Bertrand, Eric Fabre, Stefan Haar and Loïc Hélouët

    transparents The diagnosis problem amounts to deciding whether some specific "fault" event occurred or not in a system, given the observations collected on a run of this system. This system is then diagnosable if the fault can always be detected, and the active diagnosis problem consists in controlling the system in order to ensure its diagnosability. We consider here a stochastic framework for this problem: once a control is selected, the system becomes a stochastic process. In this setting, the active diagnosis problem consists in deciding whether there exists some observation-based strategy that makes the system diagnosable with probability one. We prove that this problem is EXPTIME-complete, and that the active diagnosis strategies are belief-based. The safe active diagnosis problem is similar, but aims at enforcing diagnosability while preserving a positive probability to non faulty runs, i.e. without enforcing the occurrence of a fault. We prove that this problem requires non belief-based strategies, and that it is undecidable. However, it belongs to NEXPTIME when restricted to belief-based strategies. Our work also refines the decidability/undecidability frontier for verification problems on partially observed Markov decision processes.

  • 15h30-16h: coffee break

  • 16h-16h45: John Mullins
    Opacity with Orwellian observers and Intransitive Non-interference

    transparents Opacity is a general language-theoretic scheme which may be instantiated to several security properties of a system. A behavior of a system is opaque if a passive attacker can never deduce its occurrence from the system observation. Instead of considering the case of static observability where the set of observable events is fixed off-line or dynamic observability where the set of observable events changes over time depending on the history of the trace, we consider Orwellian partial observability where unobservable events are not revealed unless some downgrading event occurs in the future of the trace. We show how to check that a regular secret is opaque for a regular language L w.r.t. an Orwellian projection while it has been proved undecidable for regular languages w.r.t. Orwellian observation functions. We finally illustrate relevancy of our results by proving the equivalence between the opacity property of regular secrets w.r.t. Orwellian projection and the intransitive non-interference property.

  • 16h45-17h30: Hervé Marchand
    Supervisory Control for Opacity

    transparents Given a labelled transition system partially observed by an attacker, and a regular predicate over the runs of the system, enforcing opacity of the secret means computing a supervisory controller such that an attacker who observes a run of the controlled system cannot ascertain that the trace of this run belongs to the secret. During this talk we will present the conditions under which such a controller can be actually computed and extend this results to the case where the controller has to enforce the opacity of a secret for a family of (possibly infinite) systems specified by a Modal Transition System.